BETWEEN SUPPORT AND RESTRICTION: STRATEGIC DILEMMAS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE DURING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

DOI 10.17721/2521-1706.2025.20.3

Yuriy Matsiyevsky,

Ph. D. (Political Science), Professor, The National University of Ostroh Academy, Ostroh, Ukraine

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9637-0572

Andriy Trofymov,

Master of Political Science, Analyst at NGO «Zmist», Poltava, Ukraine

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-9533-7710

Abstract. Why has the Biden administration responded with hesitation and inconsistency in its assistance to Ukraine since the onset of the war? This article argues that such inconsistency has been shaped by a set of strategic dilemmas. These include the prioritization of relations with Russia over other post-Soviet states the so-called ‘Moscow factor’ as well as competing imperatives: the promotion of democratic values while avoiding a direct nuclear confrontation with Russia, and support for Ukraine’s sovereignty alongside efforts to prevent a decisive Russian defeat.

The aim of this article is to reconstruct President Joe Biden’s Ukraine policy through the lens of these strategic tensions. It also examines how debates within the U.S. political establishment shaped the formula of “not letting Ukraine lose, but not letting it win,” and why this approach eroded trust in Washington as a strategic partner and contributed to the later policy shift under the Trump administration.

Methodology. The study employs a case study approach, specifically a retrospective analysis of the Biden administration’s Ukraine-related decisions in the context of domestic political changes in the United States. This methodological framework makes it possible to clarify the motives behind the administration’s restrained military and financial assistance following Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in its use of newly available data and recent findings that shed light on the internal contradictions of U.S. policy toward Ukraine during the period from 2021 to 2024.

Conclusion. The analysis demonstrates that the Biden administration’s policy of containing the Russian Federation, pursued within a broader strategy of ‘threat balancing’, aimed at exhausting Russia but also inadvertently contributed to the attrition of Ukraine. In this prolonged conflict, Ukraine found itself in a less favorable position, which subsequently allowed the Trump administration to demand greater concessions from Kyiv in efforts to end the war. At the same time, official statements and assurances of unconditional support for Ukraine were not matched by corresponding actions, as reflected in the scale and timing of military and financial assistance.

Key words: USA, Ukraine, foreign policy, Biden administration, Russian-Ukrainian war, aid.

Submitted: 02.09.2025

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