THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REALIST, LIBERAL AND CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DOI 10.17721/2521-1706.2025.20.5

Maksym Gardus,

Communication specialist of «Razom We Stand», student of Politics and international relations, European Humanities University, Vilnius, Lithuania

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7021-0181

Abstract. This article analyzes how international sanctions affect the political legitimacy of targeted regimes, addressing both domestic and international dimensions. Sanctions, as an instrument of international pressure, are increasingly used to influence the behavior of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments. However, their effectiveness in undermining political legitimacy remains a matter of academic debate.

The aim of this study is to examine the mechanisms through which sanctions affect the perceived legitimacy of ruling regimes among domestic populations and within the international community. The article distinguishes between different types of sanctions – economic, political, and symbolic – and examines their differentiated impact on regime stability and legitimacy.

Methodologically, the research is based on a comparative case study approach, using examples from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Each case is examined in terms of the pre-existing legitimacy model (traditional, charismatic, or legal-rational), the nature of sanctions imposed, and the regime’s strategic responses – including propaganda, repression, and elite consolidation.

The scientific novelty lies in the conceptual integration of theories of legitimacy (Weber, Lipset) with the practice of sanctions as a tool of international relations. This study proposes an analytical framework for evaluating when and how sanctions may erode or, paradoxically, reinforce the legitimacy of a regime.

The study concludes that sanctions do not produce uniform outcomes. In some cases, they trigger a “rally around the flag” effect, strengthening domestic support for the regime through nationalist mobilization and anti-Western rhetoric. In others, prolonged economic hardship undermines the regime’s moral and functional legitimacy, especially when opposition forces remain active and visible. The article highlights the need for targeted, well-coordinated sanctions policies that consider the internal political culture and structure of the regime to avoid unintended consequences.

Key words: іnternational sanctions, political legitimacy, authoritarian regimes, regime stability, legitimacy crisis.

Submitted: 11.08.2025

Download

References:

  1. Hufbauer, C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://ideas.repec.org/b/iie/ppress/4129.html. [In English].
  2. David,, & Lopez, G. A. (2000, April 18). The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://surl.li/cfswru. [In English].
  3. Drezner, W. (1999). The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511549366. [In English].
  4. Finnemore,, & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organisation, 52 (4), 887–917. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361. [In English].
  5. Keohane, O., & Nye, J. S. (1989). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Longman. https://surl.li/spdrhb. [In English].
  6. McGillivray,, & Stam, A. C. (2004). Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48 (2), 154–172. https://surl.li/nyvzbo. [In English].
  7. Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company. https://surl.li/useshw. [In English].
  8. Pape, A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, 22 (2), 90–136. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.90. [In English].
  9. Russett,, & Oneal, J. (2001). Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organisations. W. W. Norton & Company. https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393976847. [In English].
  10. Steve, (2005). Prognosticating About Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Implications from Strategic Selection. World Affairs, 68 (1), 13–25. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20672729. [In English].
  11. Waltz,N., & Frankel, J. (1979). Theory of International Politics. https://surl.li/hcmtrw. [In English].