DID PRESIDENT TRUMP INCREASE THE REVOLVING DOOR LOBBYING PHENOMENON IN THE U.S.?

Abstract. Despite a considerable number of studies on lobbying in the United States, the question of how presidential administrations shape the revolving-door dynamics between public service and the private sector remains debatable. Existing research has mostly focused on lobbying regulation and transparency, while the influence of executive turnover and ethics enforcement on post-service lobbying has not been systematically examined. The purpose of this article is to test whether appointments and dismissals during the first Trump administration (2017–2021) contributed to the expansion of the revolving-door lobbying phenomenon.

Methodology. The study is based on a confirmatory research design, applying hypothesis testing and an explanatory single-case approach following the framework of Widner, Woolcock, and Ortega Nieto (2022). The main method is process tracing, which helps to identify causal links between executive reshuffles, ethics regulations, and lobbying activities. Data were collected from ProPublica, OpenSecrets, and leading U.S. media sources including The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Boston Globe.

The scientific novelty lies in the first empirical attempt to trace this process through a single-case explanatory study, revealing how the structure of presidential appointments and ethics regulation shaped lobbying patterns during 2017–2021.

The results show that frequent personnel changes and the presence of former lobbyists in key posts blurred the boundaries between public office and the private sector, particularly in lobbying. These findings demonstrate that the first Trump administration functioned as a stress test for existing lobbying ethics regulations and contributed to the intensification of the revolving-door phenomenon. The overlap between cabinet appointments and industry ties blurred the lines between public service and private advocacy, undermining public trust in federal governance. These findings align with elite theory’s expectation of cyclical elite reproduction within formal institutions.

Key words: United States, American foreign policy, American domestic policy, lobbying, interest groups, revolving door, Trump administration.

Submitted: 10.02.2026

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References:

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